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Exam 19: C.L.Stevenson

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C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -What is an "interest theory" of goodness? What objections does Stevenson raise to interest theories? How does his theory differ from the interest theories he criticizes?

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Question 22

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C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that the primary use of ethical judgments is to:

A) state facts.
B) influence the interests of others.
C) describe one's own approval of things.
D) none of the above.

E) B) and C)
F) B) and D)

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C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that ethical terms are instruments used to adjust human interests.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that when we morally approve of something, we feel:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, the word "good" has a pleasing emotive meaning that fits it for:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that "Ethical claims are social instruments." What does he mean by this? Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Why does Stevenson think that goodness is not verifiable using the scientific method? How does his theory account for this?

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Which of the following claims does Stevenson make about the relationship between disagreement in interest and disagreement in belief?

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, philosophers are:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, disagreement in interest may be rooted in disagreement in belief.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, empirical methods:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -What three criteria does Stevenson claim that the "vital" sense of "good" must meet? Explain why he thinks his theory meets these criteria.